Basil Kerski - "What happened to us?" The Growth of Nationalism and Xenophobia in New Member States of the European Union of Central and Eastern Europe

I would like to concentrate at this point of my speech on the German and Polish experience. I'll start from the problem of nationalism as an integral element of communism on the example of the GDR. The founding myth of the GDR was its exemption from the responsibility for the World War II. The GDR lent no support to the discussion and self-criticism concerning German history or identity. The problem of Extermination or Holocaust were completely tabooed themes. The East German society was monoethnical. The economic crisis of the 80s, and the appearance of competition between consumers in the Soviet Bloc, taking place in (e.g.) the 70s, when the border between Poland and GDR was opened, additionally deepened animosity towards anything foreign, strengthening xenophobic reactions. In addition, the anti-Polish traditions during the period of Solidarity uprising and the introduction of Marshal Law were utilized instrumentally by the GDR authorities to - here I quote – “protect the citizens of East Germany against the virus of Solidarity“. Wishing to strengthen their own position, and the ties between society and authority, in the 80s, the Honecker’s regime not only reached for anti-Polish and anti-Slav sentiments and stereotypes, but also rediscovered the authoritarian Prussian traditions, to build the statehood identity of the occupied by the Soviet Union Eastern Germany. 

What was the situation of Poland after 1945? The pro-Soviet regime in Warsaw admittedly did not commit any ethnic cleansing in Poland in the post-war period, however it continued the policy of expulsion of ethnic groups, the policy of destruction of the multiethnic tissue of Poland; the policy which started, of course, with two totalitarianisms: Stalinist and Nazi. The disastrous heritage of the Polish People’s Republic is the ideological alliance of pro-Kremlin Communists with the pre-war National Democrat elites. Polish Communists used the National Democrat philosophy of historical thinking to legitimize the post-war change of the Polish borders, to legitimize the takeover by the post-war Polish state of the former German provinces. The image used at the time was that of their Old-Slavic, old Polish origin. Popularized was the image of Poland of the times of the Piast dynasty, not only to serve as the model of the first Polish state, but also as an ideal state. Polish Communists were also close to the National Democrats thought and their concept of Poland as a monoethnical nation. Similarly, the nationalist National Democrats were critical about the multiethnic Commonwealth, as well as about the republican definition of the Polish character: the Polish character defined by the tradition of linking different ethnic groups, different languages and different religions. Catholic Church reacted to this alliance in many contradictory ways. Facing the issue of the post-German lands it would use the rhetoric of the National Democrats referring to those territories as the Piast, Polish lands, invoking the myth of the Piast Poland. On the other hand the anticommunist circles - especially those of the leftist dissidents, including those gathered around the Clubs of Catholic Intelligence, laymen and part of émigré circles - tried to oppose the National Democrat traditions, especially those of strong nationalist, xenophobic rhetoric, trying to keep close contacts with the neighbours, to create an atmosphere of dialogue and neighbourly relations. Their great achievement was the letter of the Polish bishops to the German bishops of 1965 whose main author was the archbishop of Wrocław, Bolesław Kominek. The letter was an attempt, on the one hand, to legitimize the post-war land acquisitions, referring to the national philosophy of history, but the main element of the letter was reconciliation, i.e. breaking away from the fatalistic rhetoric of the Polish-German enmity. 

The ideological alliance between Communists and National Democracy had great influence on the Polish consciousness through the educational system. There took place - one could say – an institutionalisation of the outright nationalistic attitudes. Referring to the National Democrat traditions was not only to legitimize the post-war borders of Poland, to explicate them as an optimal solution; the most important function of the nationalist thinking was winning wide support of the Polish society. It is surely a characteristic experience for many of the states of the Soviet Bloc. 

Another key experience of the Soviet Bloc epoch was lack of dialogue between neighbours, lack of an open dialogue between the nations of Central Europe on the subject history and lack of self-critical reflection, lack of a social contact. As a result of the unfortunate heritage of the communist historical policies, the policies of identity and relations between states, hardly anybody could accurately predict or expect the peaceful developments that took place in the Central Europe of 1989 and 1990, as well as the peaceful development of relation between nations afterwards. On the contrary, expected was a direct return of conflicts between nations. Let me remind you that all neighbour relations in Central and Eastern Europe, for example that of Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, and also even Poland and the Czech Republic and Slovakia, were deeply historically strained; remember that after the war nations such as Poles or Hungarians were forced, without any social consultation or any democratic legitimization to shift the borders of their countries, as a result ethnic Poles or Hungarians found themselves outside the borders of their motherlands. Because - and this is my next argument – a complete surprise and miracle happened, the new member states of the European Union developed in such a peaceful manner that they evaded any serious ethnic conflicts inside these states, and serious conflicts between themselves. Why was there no conflict? Or: What positive tendencies or factors caused the peaceful development of the relation between states in this part of Europe and made possible the accession of these states to the European Union? Here I would also like to come back to the example of Poland and Germany. In regard to Germany, the most important element in the political discourse of the German elites - the traditional anti-Polish policy almost completely disappeared, or became almost invisible. I would like to remind you that in the democratic Weimar Republic not only the National Socialists and nationalist formations regarded Poland as “Saisonstaat“, a seasonal state, “the bastard of Versailles“, denying the independent Polish state its right to exist. The same attitudes prevailed also among most of the Germans; the democratic camp fundamentally rejected the Versailles resolutions perceiving negatively the appearance of the belt of independent countries of Central Europe in the aftermath of the World War I. Now this tradition of a negative policy towards Poland (“negative Polenpolitik”) completely disappeared; this was clearly visible at the moment of the enlargement of the European Union. Until the last moment, i.e. until 2004 the surveys in the European Union showed that the most of the German society feels apprehensive about the enlargement of the Union including Poland, especially as regards opening of the labour market. In spite of this negative, critical potential of the society, nobody from among the prominent representatives of the political elites of Germany made use of these attitudes, and eventually prevailed the consensus claiming that the accession of Poland to the European Union is in the interest of Germany liquidating its peripheral position in Europe. Prevailed the conviction that the integration of the Central Europe into the European Union not only opens a new market and investment opportunities, but will also increase safety of the country. Where lay the foundations for the change of attitudes? A very large part played here the debates of the 60s and 70s, not only those concerning the western border of Poland, the question whether they should be acknowledged or not - also a very important part played the self-critical debates concerning the 3rd Reich, not only on the subject of the heritage of anti-Semitism, but also anti-Slav attitudes and the anti-Polish policies of the 3rd Reich. In Western Germany, in the democratic Germany, was born the conviction of its responsibilities towards its eastern, Polish, neighbour. 

And as regards the East German society, a very important part in the change of attitudes played the young post-war generation, the generation critically disposed towards the GDR regime, dissatisfied with exactly the lack of critical debates in the GDR concerning the 3rd Reich, dissatisfied with the sense of lack of responsibility among the GDR elites for the Nazi Germany – the elites which were also dissatisfied with the tabooing of the Holocaust. These critical questions concerning the history of Germany were especially alive among the anticommunist and evangelical circles. These two currents fundamentally changed the German way of thinking about their neighbours and about Poland. 

I have drawn your attention to the critical attitude of Germans towards the enlargement of the European Union. Yes, it is the biggest problem, the heaviest burden to be carried by the German political culture. There is a large disproportion between the sympathies of most of the German society for their western neighbours, and on the other side – the criticism and reluctance towards the eastern ones. Interestingly enough, a sociological research shows this reluctance to be especially large in these parts Germany most distant from the eastern neighbours, situated in the western peripheries of Germany which is the richest and the most stable politically, but – it must be added – was separated from contacts with Poland or Czech Republic by the divisions of Europe. The Polish- German borderland, in spite of its own large scale social and economic problems, turns out to be a space; where in spite of the costs of the economic transformation dominates the deepest sense of community, the greatest wish to understand the neighbour, the Other. 

Unlike the German society, Poles within the last 20 years – according to a sociological research – have undergone a definite change in the perception of all their neighbours. Not only Germans are perceived by contemporary Poles neutrally, one can even daresay that with some friendliness; this change of perception took place also in other strained relations and other nations with whom Poles used to be conflicted. In case of the perception of the Germans the transformation of the attitudes went so far that today Poles wish Germany, next to the United States, becomes one of the most important political partners, and not only economically. A very positive phenomenon was the appearance among the anticommunist opposition, in the anticommunist movement and émigré circles of the tradition of critical patriotism, a self-critical reflection on the Polish history. This self-critical reflection not only changed the historical narration, i.e. freed Poles from thinking about fatalism, enmity between Germany and Poland, it also drew attention to positive chapters of the Polish-German neighbourhood, it also contributed, for example, to a critical reflection on one’s own part played by the Polish Catholics during the Holocaust, the lack of aid for the Polish Jews; it contributed to the critical reflection on the subject of the nationalist heritage, on the strong pre-war anti-Semitism. This reflection had also its influence on the thinking about international policy, about the position of Poland in Europe; thanks to the self-critical reflection Poles understood, that division of Germany is not in their interest, that it cements the presence of the imperial Russia in Central Europe, that unification of Germany is in the interest of Poland, the unification that should be done in such a way that Germany becomes a democratic state, completely integrated within the western structures. This unification was to bring Poles closer to the West, delivering them from the hegemony of the imperial communist Russia. Also the two currents of thinking about the position of Poland in Europe and the critical reflection on its history built foundations for democratic Poland and foundations for a new foreign policy, for new relations with the elites of the neighbouring states. 

Concluding my reflections I would like to raise one question – how strong are the positive tendencies I spoke about? What troubles me on the Polish side is the course assumed by the Polish debate on the subject of identity, Europe, and historical policy conducted during the recent two years. I am worried by the attacks on Jan Józef Lipski, Czesław Miłosz, the architects and authors not only of reconciliation and agreement with all the neighbours of Poland, but also different forms of thinking about history – autocriticism as the foundation of patriotism of a democratic state. This attitude was attacked; it was attacked as an extravagance in the times of keen competition between nations, competition not only in terms of economy but also competition in interpretations of history, the history of Europe and the dynamics of the European development. In this competition – so say the critics of Lipski and Miłosz – one cannot show one’s weak side, one should divert attention from one’s own errors and draw it to one’s martyrdom or positive experiences. 

I’m also saddened by the return of the National Democrat way of thinking about the Polish identity. An expression of the return was the declaration of Prime Minister, Jarosław Kaczyński given at the beginning of the 2007 election campaign in Białystok in which he emphasised the necessity of victory for PiS in the coming elections as the only force guaranteeing that Poland remains a state of one nation and not many nations. For the first time since 1989 the Prime Minister of the Polish Republic departed from the Jagiellonian definition, from the political definition of the Polish nation as a multiethnic nation – it is an alarming tendency. Of course there is a place for certain optimism coming from the results of the last election, most of the voters seemed to question this type of politics and did not get seduced by the nationalist rhetoric, showing certain maturity. It confirmed the findings of sociologists I mentioned at the beginning of my lecture, i.e. the popular wish for reasonable, peaceful relations with neighbours, a strategic partnership, for example, with Germany, in other words, normalization of the historically strained relations. 

What worries me on the German side is the fatigue with the idea of European solidarity – after a very quick and intensive enlargement of the European Union came concentration on one’s internal problems, I’m worried by the reluctance to confront the fate of other nations of Europe, such as Ukraine or Belarus which found themselves outside the borders of Europe, and it troubles me to hear stronger and stronger rhetoric claiming that under the European Union Germany should pay more attention to the national interest, more than to serve the idea of solidarity. Alarming is just this fatigue felt for the process of the European integration. In Poland, there have been levelled over the recent years accusations against the German wish for revision of history and its reinterpretation, especially concerning the history of the World War II which emphasises the German losses during the war. I think that the problem of German historic debates lies somewhere else. The first aspect, similarly to the Polish model, is a departure from the model of a self-critical reflection, the reflection able to strengthen pluralism and democracy. More and more emphasised is the large distance between the present day and the past. Little has been said about the chapter of the 3rd Reich regarding it a closed one, there has been put little emphasis on the fact that Germany should refrain from historical reflection, but instead of the auto-critical reflection and questions about the shadow cast on the present day by the heritage of history itself, there appears a pride of historical settlement, underlining the scope of distancing themselves from the heritage. Another worrying aspect is the interpretation of the history in a way that would not link it culturally with the neighbours, i.e. Poles. The discourse on the subject of extermination of the Jews is very abstract, hardly anyone remembers the six millions of European Jews and hardly anyone remembers half of those were citizens of the Polish Republic. Great interest in the fate of the Germans deportees pushes aside the memory of the Polish, or Slavic victims of the war, of the policy of extermination, the example of which is the fate of Polish or Slavic elites in Central Europe. One feels an apparent tendency for creating distance between the Polish and German interpretations of the war. I speak about these issues, of course, in a very superficial manner, a very general one, I try to sketch the prevailing tendencies; this does not mean that there are no positive ones, for example that among the German elites there is no awareness of the fact that most of the European Jews were Polish Jews, that Poland was the centre of the European Jewry, that the policies of the 3rd Reich contributed to the destruction of the multiethnic tissue of the Polish Republic. Such consciousness does exist, but it seems to be rather marginal. 

Worrying is also a certain dissemination of thinking about Europe. Germans – similarly to other European nations – are shocked by the outcome of the war in Iraq, also of their commitment in Afghanistan; the experiences of the Middle East and Central Asia caused marginalization of the idea of international commitment in support of democracy; as a result this country – similarly to Poland – turns inside towards its own problems, shuts itself away. It is particularly apparent in their passivity, especially towards the processes of democratization, whether in the Balkans, or in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Marginal is the assistance in the stabilization of the Ukrainian democracy, and the almost devastating in its consequences passivity – not only of Germany, but also of Poland – in the issue of strengthening the Belarusian independence movements. 

The Polish elections of the 21st October 2007 and their positive reception in Germany allow me to finish my reflections with an optimistic note. The winner in Poland was not just a certain party, or some politicians, but a relatively complex historical thought; prevailed the idea of pluralism and the idea of Poland as a multiethnic state. The elected Prime Minister of Poland is a person who in his own mother town, Gdańsk, during the last 17 years contributed to a complex reflection on history; not only on the subject of the history of the Polish-German relation, but also self-critical reflection on the Polish relations with other nations. Won the parties which postulate the construction of a new, multifaceted identity of Poles which will consist of three elements: attachment to one’s own place of residence as a citizen, one’s own small region, one’s own “small motherland”, attachment to Poland as a democratic nation, and the third dimension: strong emphasis on the European identity, attachment to a certain catalogue of values such as pluralism, respect in relations with others, multiculturalism; but also attachment to anti-totalitarian traditions. The winning parties are postulating and want to contribute to the building of a complex identity of Poles. 

It is also a process facing Germany, also this part of Germany which from the late 40s has been democratic, this part Germany which since the 50s has taken part an active part in the process of European integration. Also this part of Germany, in the European dimension of its identity, must understand that new Europe not only consists of new members but has been culturally enriched with a new historic experience, and it also must make an acquaintance with the democratic traditions of its neighbours, must simply learn how to deal with these new, still alien, new members. And also facing this part of Europe, “the old Europe” one can say, is the challenge of building its own complex identity which is just a process of fighting the heritage of nationalism and xenophobia in Central Europe. 

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to one more thing: A very important factor impeding the process of democratization and causing a remission of nationalist currents is the return to promotion of one’s individual perspective, one’s own culture under the European dialogue of cultures. This is what caught Krzysztof Czyżewski’s attention in his 2006 interview for the Polish-German Magazine DIALOGUE (Dialogue of Cultures. With Krzysztof Czyżewski speaks Maja Jaszewska; Polish-German Magazine DIALOGUE No. 74-75, 2006). “Today – he said – we reflect less on the building of the common space of agorae, and are investing less effort in the cognition of the other, the Other, but more in the promotion and presentation of our own experiences. This European dialogue of cultures is actually one great collection of different monologues.” Yes, it is a tendency which I also clearly observe, and which troubles me, and which in our part of Europe, one that is comparatively stable and in which the young democratic culture is well rooted, can contribute to the growth of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes.